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LITIGATING INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AFTER 
THERASENSE, EXERGEN, AND THE AIA: 
LESSONS FOR LITIGANTS, OPTIONS FOR OWNERS 
 
Lisa A. Dolak* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2010, the Federal Circuit undertook to reconsider, en banc, the 
standards governing the judicially-created defense of inequitable conduct.1 The 
level of amici participation in the case, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & 
Co., reflected the importance to the patent and business communities of the 
issues considered. The United States, companies, intellectual property 
organizations, bar associations, industry organizations, law professors, 
practitioners and others weighed in on issues including the definition of 
materiality, what evidence should (and should not) suffice to establish deceptive 
intent, and appropriate inequitable conduct remedies.2 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Lisa A. Dolak. Angela S. Cooney Professor of Law, Syracuse 
University College of Law. I can be reached at ladolak@law.syr.edu. 
 1 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-
1514, 2008-1595, 2010 WL 1655391 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010) (ordering en banc review). 
 2 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. et al. in Support of 
Appellees and in Favor of Affirmance, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008–1511, 2008–1512, 2008–1513, 2008–1514, 
2008–1595) (“There is no need and no justification for changing the current definition of 
materiality . . . or for modifying the current principles by which deceptive intent may be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence . . . .”); Brief of Amici Curiae Acacia Research 
Corp. and 1st Media, LLC in Support of Neither Party and in Support of Returning the 
“Unenforceability” Defense to Its Traditional Scope of “Unclean Hands”, Therasense, 
649 F.3d 1276 (recommending the Court return to the unclean hands standard set out in 
Supreme Court cases); Brief for Amici Curiae 22 Patent Prosecution Firms and 
Practitioners Supporting Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (“A return to the 
doctrine’s roots in common law fraud as articulated in the Keystone trilogy . . . would 
provide a more equitable analytical framework to decide questions of misconduct.”); 
Brief and Appendix of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, Therasense, 649 
F.3d 1276 (recommending that the court adopt a “but for” standard of materiality); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae the American Intellectual Property Law Assoc. in Support of Neither 
Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (recommending that the court adopt a “but for” 
standard for materiality); Brief of Eisai Co., Ltd. and Eisai Inc. as Amici Curiae on 
Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 
(recommending a “but for” materiality standard and flexibility to district courts in 
crafting equitable remedies for inequitable conduct); Brief of Intellectual Property 
Owners Assoc. in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (encouraging the 
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On May 25, 2011, a divided court re-defined and limited the defense.3 In 
the two years since then, the Federal Circuit and the district courts have had the 
opportunity to apply the new standards in various procedural contexts.4 Their 
decisions reflect the impact of Therasense on litigating inequitable conduct.5 
Furthermore, Therasense has altered the potential utility of post-grant 
examination to thwart or undermine inequitable conduct challenges.6 But 
Therasense is not the only significant recent development affecting inequitable 
conduct litigation. 
Before Therasense, the Federal Circuit had issued an important ruling 
relating to pleading inequitable conduct. The court’s decision in Exergen Corp. 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,7 has itself had a significant impact on litigating 
inequitable conduct.8 Moreover, since Therasense, Congress has given patent 
owners an opportunity to take anticipated inequitable conduct issues off the 
table for litigation.9 
Without a doubt, the inequitable conduct litigation landscape has 
changed. A careful, thorough consideration of all of these developments and 
  
court to adopt a “but for” standard of materiality and eliminating the sliding scale for 
inferring intent from materiality); Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (recommending 
the addition of a third element to the inequitable conduct framework which requires a 
showing of “reasonable reliance” by the USPTO on the misrepresentation or omission); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Assoc. of Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest 
in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 
(advocating for rejecting the “but for” standard of materiality and abandoning the “should 
have known” and “most reasonable inference” standards for intent to deceive); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors Concerning En Banc Review of 
Inequitable Conduct and in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 
(encouraging the court to adopt 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 as the standard for materiality in 
inequitable conduct); Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (encouraging the 
court to limit inequitable conduct to claims asserted in the litigation and to abandon the 
sliding scale test for proving intent from materiality); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 
1276 (encouraging the court to adopt 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) as the standard for materiality); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the University of Akron School of Law, Center for Intellectual 
Property Law & Technology, in Support of Affirmance on En Banc Review, Therasense, 
649 F.3d 1276 (encouraging the court to adopt 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 as the sole standard for 
materiality in the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
 3 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1297. 
 4 See infra Parts I.A.2 and I.B.2.c. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See infra Part III.A. 
 7 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 8 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 9 See infra Part II. 
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their implications is a must for any litigant or counsel faced with or considering 
asserting a charge of inequitable conduct. This Article discusses these 
significant recent inequitable conduct-related developments and their combined 
impact on litigating the defense. Part I of this Article reviews the new judicial 
standards for pleading and proving inequitable conduct, illustrates their 
application in recent Federal Circuit and district court decisions, and 
summarizes lessons for litigators from recent cases. Part II discusses the 
legislature’s recent contribution to the inequitable conduct landscape: the 
supplemental examination proceeding created by the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA).10 Part III considers the options, post-Therasense and the 
AIA, for patent owners faced with a potential inequitable conduct challenge. 
Following Part III is a conclusion of the discussion. 
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. 
1. New Substantive Standards 
Citing concerns regarding the frequency with which inequitable conduct 
was being alleged in patent cases, and the consequences of those allegations for 
the courts, patent prosecutors, and the United States Patent & Trademark Office 
(USPTO), the en banc Federal Circuit in Therasense announced stricter 
standards for proving the defense of inequitable conduct.11 After Therasense, a 
challenger must still “prove that the applicant misrepresented or omitted 
material information with the specific intent to deceive the [USPTO]”12 by clear 
and convincing evidence.13 However, a new, narrower definition of materiality 
now governs inequitable conduct determinations post-Therasense. The general 
rule is that the misrepresented or omitted information must be “but-for 
material”—the challenger must prove that “the [USPTO] would not have 
allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed” or correct information.14 
The court made an exception to this requirement for “cases of affirmative 
  
 10 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 11 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290–93 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
 12 Id. at 1287. The court had previously announced the “specific intent to deceive” 
standard in Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 13 Id. at 1287. 
 14 Id. at 1291. In making such a determination, a court is to “apply the preponderance 
of the evidence standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction,” in 
accordance with USPTO practice. Id. at 1291–92 (citing Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (MPEP) §§ 706, 2111 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010)). 
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egregious misconduct.”15 Specifically, “[w]hen the patentee has engaged in 
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably 
false affidavit, the misconduct is material.”16 
Regarding intent, “[a] finding that [a] misrepresentation or omission 
amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known’ 
standard does not satisfy th[e] intent requirement.”17 The Therasense majority 
gave an example: 
“In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear and convincing 
evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate decision to 
withhold a known material reference.” In other words, the accused 
infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant 
knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate 
decision to withhold it.18 
The third significant holding of Therasense concerned the “‘sliding 
scale,’ where a weak showing of intent [could] be found sufficient based on a 
strong showing of materiality, and vice versa.”19 The majority declared that 
“[i]ntent and materiality are separate requirements.”20 It instructed the district 
courts not to use a “sliding scale,” and specifically directed that “a district court 
may not infer intent solely from materiality.”21 Again, giving an example, the 
court stated that “[p]roving that the applicant knew of a reference, should have 
known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the [USPTO] does not 
prove specific intent to deceive.”22 
The court acknowledged that “a district court may infer intent from 
indirect and circumstantial evidence.”23 But it reiterated that such an inference 
should be drawn only if it is “the single most reasonable inference able to be 
drawn from the evidence.”24 “Hence, when there are multiple reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found.”25 
  
 15 Id. at 1292. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 1290. 
 18 Id. (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. (citing Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 23 Id. at 1290. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 1290–91. 
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2. The New Standards in Operation 
a. Materiality After Therasense 
The Federal Circuit had occasion to apply the new Therasense standards 
shortly after they were announced. On June 27, 2011, in American Calcar, Inc. 
v. American Honda Motor Co.,26 the court applied the “but-for materiality” 
standard to distinguish between prior art information that had been found to 
anticipate the claims at issue—inherently a finding that the USPTO would not 
have issued those claims27—and other information as to which no such specific 
finding had been made.28 As to the latter information, the Federal Circuit 
vacated the district court’s findings of materiality and remanded for 
consideration of the issue under the standard set forth in the interim in 
Therasense.29 American Calcar illustrates how the Federal Circuit has upheld 
materiality findings where the undisclosed prior art was found to invalidate the 
claims at issue.30 
In the two years since the Federal Circuit decided Therasense, the court 
has had limited opportunity to apply the Therasense materiality standards to 
information other than undisclosed prior art. A fulsome understanding of the 
new boundaries of material information must await the development of the case 
law, but the court has begun to lay down some markers. For example, the court 
considered an applicant’s failure to update a Petition to Make Special in Powell 
  
 26 651 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 27 A district court evaluates anticipation and obviousness under a “clear and 
convincing” standard of proof. See, e.g., ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 700 
F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 
2238 (2011)) (“Anticipation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”); In re 
Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 517–18 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (“The district court 
applied the correct standard, that the challenger must demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary 
skill in the field of the invention at the time the invention was made.”). Accordingly, a 
district court’s finding of invalidity reflects a level of proof beyond what would be 
required to establish that the USPTO would not have issued the claims at issue applying 
its “preponderance of the evidence” standard. 
 28 See Am. Calcar, 651 F.3d at 1335. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. Compare Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (affirming a district court’s finding of materiality, having affirmed the district 
court’s finding that the withheld references rendered obvious the claims at issue), with 
August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the 
district court’s dismissal of the accused infringer’s inequitable conduct counterclaim 
where the undisclosed product, even if on sale prior art, “would not render the asserted 
claims obvious in view of the other cited prior art”). 
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v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.31 There, the applicant had failed to alert the USPTO 
that he was no longer under an obligation to manufacture, as he had asserted in 
his previously-filed petition.32 According to the court, the applicant’s failure-to-
update “obviously fails the but-for materiality standard and is not the type of 
unequivocal act, ‘such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit,’ that 
would rise to the level of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct.’”33 
The Federal Circuit also applied the Therasense materiality standard in 
Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc.34 Without specifically 
applying the “but-for” standard, the court held that the existence of litigation 
regarding a parent patent was not material to the prosecution of a continuation 
where, during the pendency of the continuation, the litigation (a declaratory 
judgment action relating only to non-infringement) did not involve allegations of 
invalidity or unenforceability.35 
The court, however, declined to decide whether a false declaration of 
small entity status qualifies as “an unmistakably false affidavit” for purposes of 
the Therasense “affirmative egregious misconduct” exception to the “but-for 
materiality” requirement.36 Acknowledging that “on its face, it appears that a 
false small entity declaration would fall within the definition of an 
‘unmistakably false affidavit,’ particularly since a party that claims entitlement 
to small entity status does so in a sworn written declaration,” the court held that 
it “need not decide that question,” because “there was no evidence that anyone 
involved in the patent prosecution knew that a patent license had been granted to 
a large entity and deliberately withheld that information in order to pay small 
entity fees.”37 This case illustrates how the Federal Circuit, in particular, may 
increasingly rely on insufficient record evidence of deceptive intent to decide 
appeals relating to inequitable conduct.38 Thus, the intent prong of the analysis 
(discussed below) may come to dominate the inequitable conduct inquiry post-
Therasense, and the development of the law concerning the new materiality 
standards may proceed at a slower pace. In contrast, the less exacting materiality 
  
 31 663 F.3d 1221, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 32 Id. at 1235. 
 33 Id. The court did not elaborate. 
 34 695 F.3d 1285, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 35 Id. at 1290–91. 
 36 Id. at 1294. 
 37 Id. at 1294–95 (noting that the applicable regulation allows for the correction of 
good faith mistakes in small entity claims). 
 38 See also infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
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standards in force prior to Therasense led to an expanding list of potentially 
material information.39 
b. Deceptive Intent After Therasense 
The Federal Circuit has thus far rigorously enforced its “most reasonable 
inference” requirement for evidence of deceptive intent. For example, in Cordis 
Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,40 the court affirmed a district court’s holding 
that the patents at issue were not unenforceable for inequitable conduct because 
the district court had concluded that “‘the inferences argued by [the patentee] are 
supported by evidence of record and are as reasonable as those inferences 
argued by [the challengers].’”41 Similarly, in In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent 
Litigation,42 the court affirmed “that unenforceability based on inequitable 
conduct was not established,” despite affirming the district court’s determination 
that the undisclosed references at issue were material, because “deceptive intent 
was not the single most reasonable inference” based on the evidence.43 
Further, in accordance with its Therasense directive regarding the need to 
assess evidence of deceptive intent “independent of its analysis of materiality,”44 
the court has also vacated or reversed (pre-Therasense) findings of intent that 
were predicated significantly on findings of materiality. For example, in 1st 
Media, LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,45 the court reversed a judgment of 
unenforceability without evaluating but-for materiality where the evidence 
supported only that the inventor and his lawyer “(1) knew of the references, (2) 
may have known they were material . . . , and (3) did not inform the [USPTO] of 
them” and thus failed to establish that they “‘made a deliberate decision to 
withhold [them].’”46 And in American Calcar, discussed above, the court 
  
 39 See Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine Worth Saving, 11 
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 11 (2010) (discussing how “recent Federal 
Circuit decisions have expanded the categories of potentially material information”); see 
also Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 738 (2011) (“Courts have expanded the doctrine’s reach 
so that in its present incarnation, inequitable conduct encompasses not only 
misrepresentations and omissions amounting to outright fraud but also to an amorphous 
category of somewhat lesser sins.”). 
 40 658 F.3d 1347, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 41 Id. at 1360–61 (quoting Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 641 F. Supp. 2d 
353, 359 (D. Del. 2009)). 
 42 703 F.3d 511 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 43 Id. at 521–22 (“The district court found that the evidence as a whole ‘paints a more 
innocent explanation of Mr. Shibata as a new and inexperienced manager attempting to 
handle an understaffed and overworked Patent Department.’”). 
 44 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 45 694 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 46 Id. at 1376–77 (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290) (emphasis added). 
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vacated a “finding” of inequitable conduct where the district court “made no 
holding that any of the inventors . . . made a deliberate decision to withhold it” 
but “[i]nstead . . . bas[ed] its finding of intent significantly on the materiality of 
the [withheld information] to the claimed invention.”47 
However, in Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.,48 the court upheld a 
pre-Therasense finding of deceptive intent “[b]ased on the district court’s 
thorough discussion of its factual findings and its well-reasoned analysis that 
[was] consistent with Therasense.”49 The Federal Circuit pointed to the district 
court’s specific findings that the witness’s explanations for withholding the 
references at issue lacked credibility, and “other evidence,” such as the witness’s 
knowledge of the relevant prior art, his selective citation of information to the 
USPTO, and inconsistencies between the witness’s testimony and corporate 
documents regarding relevant experiments.50 This case shows that the exacting 
post-Therasense intent standard can be met, with appropriate evidence and 
detailed, specific judicial findings. 
B. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
1. New Pleading Standards 
Exergen was aimed at curbing inequitable conduct allegations at their 
source—the pleadings. In this 2009 panel decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
a district court decision denying an infringement defendant’s motion to amend 
its answer to allege inequitable conduct on the ground that the allegations of the 
amendment were insufficiently particular under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b).51 The court held that “simply aver[ring] the substantive elements of 
inequitable conduct, without setting forth the particularized factual bases for the 
allegation, does not satisfy Rule 9(b).”52 
Standing alone, this holding is not particularly remarkable, given that in 
several cases preceding Exergen the Federal Circuit had expressly enforced a 
requirement for specificity in inequitable conduct pleadings.53 What is 
  
 47 Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 48 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 49 Id. at 1337. 
 50 Id. at 1335–37. 
 51 575 F.3d 1312, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 52 Id. at 1326–27. 
 53 See, e.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, 
P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding insufficient a charge that “during 
prosecution . . . the patentee failed to disclose all the relevant prior art known to it” and 
“by manipulation of various measurements and units, the patentee sought to mislead the 
[USPTO] regarding the relationship between the claimed invention and the prior art”); 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting as 
insufficiently particular an allegation that a patentee “was motivated to extend its patent 
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noteworthy about the panel ruling in Exergen is the degree and nature of the 
specificity it demands. According to the court, “in pleading inequitable conduct 
in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, 
when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed 
before the [USPTO].”54 Applying this standard, the court held that a recitation 
that “Exergen, its agent and/or attorneys” failed to identify the “who,” and the 
pleading inadequately set forth the “‘what’ and ‘where’ of the material 
omissions” by “fail[ing] to identify which claims, and which limitations in those 
claims, the withheld references are relevant to, and where in those references the 
material information is found.”55 It similarly held that generally stating that the 
withheld references “are ‘material’ and ‘not cumulative to the information 
already of record’” fails to “explain both ‘why’ the withheld information is 
material and not cumulative, and ‘how’ an examiner would have used this 
information in assessing the patentability of the claims.”56 The court indicated 
that “identify[ing] the particular claim limitations, or combination of claim 
limitations, that are supposedly absent from the information of record” would be 
necessary in this regard.57 
As to intent, the Federal Circuit held that: 
although “knowledge” and “intent” may be averred generally, a pleading 
of inequitable conduct under [Fed. R. Civ. Proc.] Rule 9(b) must include 
sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may 
reasonably infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld 
material information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and 
(2) withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific intent to 
deceive the [USPTO].58 
Applying this standard, the court held that the defendant’s allegations regarding 
the patentee’s deceptive intent, in failing to disclose the references at issue, were 
insufficient.59 Furthermore, the court held that merely alleging awareness of a 
reference does not allege knowledge of the supposedly material information 
contained in the reference.60 Moreover, the court also stated that an allegation 
“that an applicant disclosed a reference during prosecution of one application, 
  
monopoly beyond the [patent] term by patenting [a structurally-similar compound], and it 
needed to conjure up ‘unexpected’ results”); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Inc. v. 
Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding the district court’s 
dismissal of an accused infringer’s inequitable conduct charge for lacking particularity 
because the accused infringer merely asserted that a patent revival was “improper”). 
 54 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. 
 55 Id. at 1329. 
 56 Id. at 1329–30. 
 57 Id. at 1329. 
 58 Id. at 1328–29. 
 59 Id. at 1331. 
 60 See id. at 1330. 
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but did not disclose it during prosecution of a related application, is insufficient 
to meet the threshold level of deceptive intent required to support an allegation 
of inequitable conduct.”61 
2. The New Standards in Operation 
a. Pleading the “Who” 
The recent decision of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware in Senju Pharm. Co., v. Apotex, Inc.62 provides a good illustration of 
what Exergen requires as to the particularity of the facts alleged. According to 
the court: 
Apotex alleges that “but for” material omissions and misrepresentations 
made by “Senju [Pharma], Kyorin, the inventors, and/or those acting on 
their behalf” with an intent to deceive the [USPTO], the reexamined 
claims of the ‘045 patent would not have issued. Specifically, the 
pleadings allege that the following materials were withheld: (1) portions of 
the trial record and expert reports from the prior litigation disclosing that 
Kyorin’s researchers had been the first to make and test gatifloxacin 
ophthalmic formulations covered by the ‘045 patent claims; (2) evidence 
showing that the formulations as claimed by the ‘045 patent did not exhibit 
unexpected results; and (3) deposition testimony of Senju’s expert from 
the prior litigation allegedly conceding the obviousness of preparing 
aqueous liquid compositions containing 0.3 w/v% gaitfloxacin and 0.01 
w/v% of disodium edetate, based on the well-known use of disodium 
edetate to prevent coloration.63 
The court compared these allegations against the required “who, what, 
when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed 
before the [USPTO].”64 The court held that the “pleadings at issue sufficiently 
plead the ‘how’ . . . and ‘where’ standards” (by alleging that the patentee 
mislead the USPTO regarding “evidence of obviousness, secondary 
considerations, and the scope of the patent’s written description”).65 
Furthermore, the court held that the pleadings met “the ‘what’ . . . and ‘when’ 
. . . standards and plead the requisite state of mind.”66 The “what” was satisfied 
by the allegation that “material evidence and testimony” was omitted, and the 
“when” was met by the allegation that the patentee’s actions occurred “during 
reexamination of the ‘045 patent.”67 As for the “requisite state of mind,” “[t]he 
  
 61 Id. at 1331. 
 62 921 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Del. 2013). 
 63 Id. at 300–01 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 64 See id. at 306 (applying Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329–30). 
 65 See id. at 306–07. 
 66 Id. at 307. 
 67 See id. 
Litigating Inequitable Conduct After Therasense, Exergen, 
No. 1] and the AIA: Lessons for Litigants, Options for Owners 61 
 
 
 
 
court can reasonably infer, given the volume of materials from the prior 
litigation that was submitted during reexamination, that the materials that were 
withheld were done so with knowledge and intent to deceive the [USPTO].”68 
However, the court found that the challenger’s allegations did not meet 
the Exergen pleading standard with respect to the “who” (deceived the USPTO) 
requirement.69 Starting from the premise that “[t]he duty of candor and good 
faith in dealing with the [USPTO] applies to individuals, not organizations,” the 
court noted that the challenger alleged “that ‘Senju [Pharma], Kyorin, the 
inventors and/or those acting on their behalf made the alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions before the [USPTO’].”70 It compared the 
reference to “Senju [Pharma], Kyorin, the inventors and/or those acting on their 
behalf” to the “similarly-worded allegation—only naming ‘Exergen, its agents 
and/or attorneys’”—found lacking in Exergen “because it failed to identify the 
specific individual or individuals who deceived the [USPTO],”71 and those held 
insufficient by the Delaware district court in XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 
Inc.,72—allegations of inequitable conduct against “Abraham Zelkin or one or 
more of the other individuals listed as an inventor.”73 
The problems in Senju were the challenger’s references to entities and its 
“broadly cast net around the inventors and those acting on their behalf.”74 
Similar insufficiencies resulted in the dismissal of inequitable conduct 
allegations in Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nichia Corp.,75 where the 
pleading accused “‘Yoshinori Shimzu, Kensho Sakano, Yasunobu Noguchi, 
Toshio Moriguchi, and/or other persons who were substantially involved in the 
preparation or prosecution of the application that led to the [patent at issue].’”76 
Similarly, in Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. GE,77 the inequitable conduct 
allegations were dismissed where the pleading attributed the alleged inequitable 
conduct to “‘the named inventors Kazunari Ide, Yoshoyuki Hayashi, and 
Masaaki Shibata, and/or the attorneys and agents substantively involved in the 
preparation or prosecution of the [patent at issue]’” and to “‘applicants.’”78 
  
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 868 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Del. 2012). 
 73 Senju, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (quoting XpertUniverse, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 381). 
According to the court in XpertUniverse, by using “the qualifiers that either Zelkin, or 
‘one or more’ of the other inventors, knew about the [withheld information] and [its] 
materiality—[the pleader in XpertUniverse] afford[ed] the possibility that Zelkin, the 
only specific individual named, did not know about them at all.” 868 F. Supp. 2d at 381. 
 74 See Senju, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
 75 907 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 76 Id. at 871 (emphasis added). 
 77 No. 6:10-cv-812-ORL-28, 2012 WL 831525 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2012). 
 78 Id. at *2. 
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According to the Mitsubishi court, the problem was the use of the “and/or” 
conjunction: 
The double “and/or” conjunction is too often used by lawyers trying to 
cover all bases. Its use often has unintended consequences. Through the 
“and” part of the conjunction, GE has managed to lump the named 
inventors, attorneys, and agents together under the title “Applicants,” and 
through the “or” portion GE has disjoined them; the result is that GE has 
failed to specifically identify who is guilty of misconduct . . . . Moreover, a 
strict application of the “or” alternative of the double conjunction in this 
case results in an allegation that either the named inventors or some other 
individual or individuals engaged in deceptive conduct. The other 
individual or individuals, who remain unnamed, are perhaps the only ones 
to have engaged in the suspect behavior. Under this construction, GE 
certainly cannot be said to have made an allegation against a particular 
person.79 
This type of searching analysis is typical of district court decisions 
regarding the sufficiency of inequitable conduct allegations post-Exergen.80 The 
district court’s decision in Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc.81 is particularly 
illuminating, as the court carefully distinguished among various allegations 
regarding the persons alleged to have engaged in inequitable conduct. The 
defendants’ pleading identified the following persons who allegedly “knowingly 
failed to disclose material information to the [USPTO]”:82 
 
• Oracle International; 
• Kim Rejndrup, the ‘221 patent inventor; 
• “Each attorney or agent who prepared or prosecuted the 
application”; 
• “Every other person who was substantively involved in the 
preparation or prosecution of the application that became the ‘221 
patent and who was associated with the inventor, with the assignee, 
or with anyone to whom there was an obligation to assign the 
application”; 
• “Every individual having a duty of disclosure under 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.56”83 
  
 79 Id. 
 80 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 630, 637 
(E.D. Va. 2012) (denying the patentee’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s inequitable 
conduct counterclaim); Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 885, 900 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011) (granting leave to amend to supplement inequitable conduct allegations with 
additional facts). 
 81 Oracle, 807 F. Supp. 2d 885. 
 82 Id. at 897. 
 83 Id. at 897–98. 
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According to the court: 
All but one of these categories are quite general and will not suffice on 
their own under Exergen . . . . DrugLogic has adequately pled the “who” 
of the alleged material omission with respect to Mr. Rejndrup, but not with 
respect to any other person. In any amended complaint, DrugLogic may 
only name specific, identified individuals, including Mr. Rejndrup.84 
The Oracle decision clearly illustrates a significant Exergen impact: pleadings 
alleging inequitable conduct will generally be required to “name names.”85 
b. Pleading the “What” and “Where” 
How to satisfactorily plead the “what” and “where” of the alleged 
inequitable conduct depends on the type of conduct at issue. In Exergen, for 
example, where the inequitable conduct challenge was based (in part) on an 
alleged withholding of material prior art,86 the Federal Circuit held that in 
“fail[ing] to identify which claims, and which limitations in those claims, the 
withheld references are relevant to, and where in those references the material 
information is found” the pleading failed to sufficiently allege “the ‘what’ and 
  
 84 Id. at 898. 
 85 See also Bruce D. DeRenzi & Sean E. Jackson, A Procedural Remedy for the 
“Plague”? Pleading Inequitable Conduct After Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
N.Y. INTELL. PROP. ASSOC. BULLETIN 10 (Aug./Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.crowell.com/documents/A-Procedural-Remedy-for-the-Plague-Pleading-
Inequitable-Conduct-After-Exergen-Corp-v-Wal-Mart.pdf (“The ‘who’ requirement is 
straightforward. A pleading must identify the specific individual(s) alleged to have 
engaged in inequitable conduct.”); Gary Fischman, Inequitable Conduct Pleadings, Post-
Exergen, LAW360 (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/184527/ 
inequitable-conduct-pleadings-post-exergen (“While in the past some courts would allow 
pleadings to merely allege ‘an inventor’ or ‘a prosecuting attorney,’ under Exergen 
litigants must specifically identify the person who committed the inequitable conduct.”); 
Salvatore B. Tamburo & Daniel P. Archibald, Inequitable Conduct—Alive and Well Post-
Exergen . . . At Least for Now, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2010/08/inequitable-conduct-alive-and-well-post-
exergen-iat-least-for-now.asp (noting that “most district courts appear to require that the 
allegations name the specific individual(s) accused of the inequitable conduct,” but citing 
Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Canon U.S.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126174, at *7–10 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 26, 2009), as an example of a post-Exergen decision holding that “the pleadings may 
generally name the inventor(s), the prosecuting attorney(s), and/or other individual(s) 
who have a duty of disclosure under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 where at least one person is 
specifically named and adequate additional facts are pleaded so as to allow the court to 
‘reasonably infer deceptive intent’”). 
 86 See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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‘where’ of the material omission.”87 Obviously, in undisclosed-reference-type 
situations, specific identification (e.g., by page and/or line numbers) to the 
precise location of the allegedly material information in the reference and a 
corresponding identification of the claim limitation(s) allegedly undermined by 
the undisclosed reference should suffice.88 However, what should matter is that 
the pleading somehow identifies the specific information that was (allegedly) 
withheld or misrepresented and connect it to the claim coverage or other benefit 
the patent owner obtained as a result. 
The recent decision of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois in CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC89 illustrates 
this pragmatic application of the “what” and “where” requirements of Exergen. 
The challenger, CoStar, identified particular references that were omitted from a 
declaration the patent owner had submitted in response to a USPTO request 
(during prosecution) that the patent owner identify the most relevant among 
hundreds of disclosed references.90 It alleged “that the omitted references 
disclose the use of the Internet or ‘internet-like networking systems generally’ to 
communicate between a user and a remote database from which the user seeks 
information.”91 It further alleged “that the references are relevant ‘to all the 
asserted claims of the ‘335 Patent, as claim 1, the only independent claim, 
pertains to ‘advertising over the Internet’, and all other claims of the ‘335 Patent 
are dependent on claim 1.’”92 
In response to the patent owner’s Exergen-based challenge, the court held 
that the latter allegation “adequately identifies the claims the withheld references 
are relevant to.”93 Regarding “where in the references the relevant information is 
found,” the court acknowledged that the pleading at issue did “not identify page 
  
 87 Id. at 1329. 
 88 The defendant’s use of a claim chart to illustrate the relevance of an allegedly 
withheld reference to particular claims of the patent at issue was cited as satisfying the 
“where” requirement in BASF Catalysts LLC v. Aristo Inc., No. 2:07-cv-222-PPS-APR, 
2010 WL 2952982, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2010) (“The similarity between the processes 
the [withheld reference] seeks to protect and the claims levied against Aristo under the 
[challenged] patent is striking and satisfies the ‘where’ component.”). See also Konami 
Digital Entm’t Co. v. Harmonix Music Sys., Inc., No. 6:08cv286–JD, 2009 WL 5061812, 
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009) (“The Court is similarly persuaded that Viacom has met 
the “what” and “where” requirements with pleadings that identify charts of potentially 
invalidating Konami prior art games—on a claim-by-claim and limitation-by-limitation 
basis.”). 
 89 Nos. 12 C 4986, 12 C 7091, 12 C 8632, 2013 WL 2151548 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 
2013). 
 90 Id. at *10. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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numbers to specifically pinpoint the relevant information.”94 However, by 
“stating that the withheld references ‘disclose the use of CompuServe on the 
Internet’ and ‘were relevant in teaching the use of the Internet-like networking 
systems generally,’” the pleading (in the court’s view) “describe[d] what 
information in the references is relevant.”95 The court continued: 
Although a party alleging inequitable conduct would be well-advised to 
include page numbers, doing so is not absolutely necessary to meet 
Exergen’s requirements if the pleading adequately describes the relevant 
information. Indeed, if the relevant information is adequately described, 
filling in the page and line numbers is merely an academic, redundant 
exercise. This court will not require such technical pleading . . . . In the 
context of the patents-in-suit, CoStar’s descriptions plainly indicate that 
the relevant information in the withheld references is how to use the 
Internet to communicate between a user and a remote database from which 
the user seeks information.96 
A comparatively more strict interpretation of the “what” and “where” 
requirements in the context of allegedly withheld material prior art is illustrated 
by the Oracle decision. The inequitable conduct allegations at issue concerned 
the alleged nondisclosure of specified “hierarchical relational medical thesaurus 
dictionaries” during the prosecution of the asserted patent.97 The patent owner 
summarized the invention as follows: 
The presently claimed system is operable to store and classify a plurality 
of terms, such as clinical or scientific terms according to a hierarchy of 
relations. The relations define and organize the terms according to more 
general and more specific terms. In other words, the relations may indicate 
which terms may be subclasses[,] superclasses[,] or synonyms of other 
terms. Such organization is beneficial in scientific or medical studies 
where large quantities of data are processed and consistency among term 
usage may not be deterministic.98 
According to the challenger, “this statement also describes already-existing 
hierarchical relational medical thesaurus dictionaries such as” those alleged to 
have been withheld, and a subsequent claim amendment further limiting the 
relevant thesauruses to those “of clinical terms used in conjunction with a 
clinical study” also did not distinguish or diminish the relevance of the allegedly 
withheld prior art.99 The level of specificity in these allegations appears on par 
  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at *10–11. 
 97 See Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889–90 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 98 Id. at 890. 
 99 See id. 
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with those held adequate for “what” and “where” purposes in the CoStar 
decision discussed above.100 But the Oracle court held them insufficient: 
DrugLogic does not specifically identify any claims of the ‘221 patent or 
particular limitation in those claims to which the allegedly withheld 
references are relevant. DrugLogic only provides generalized descriptions 
of the claims of the ‘221 patent within block quotations of statements 
allegedly made by Oracle to the [USPTO] during the prosecution of the 
‘221 patent. Although DrugLogic identifies potentially material 
information contained in the allegedly withheld references by noting that 
WHO-Drug, COSTART, Read Codes, CPT, Unified Medical Language 
System, Metathesaurus, MeSH, and PubMed are all “hierarchical 
relational medical thesauruses,” some of which contain “clinical terms 
used in conjunction with clinical studies,” DrugLogic fails to allege where 
specifically in those references that material could be found. Thus, the 
Court finds that DrugLogic has not properly pled the “what” and “where” 
of the alleged material omission.101 
These two decisions—Oracle and CoStar—illustrate how the district courts may 
vary in their applications of the Exergen “what” and “where” standards. 
As noted above, the required “what” and “where” allegations must 
necessarily be tailored to the nature and circumstances of the alleged improper 
conduct. The “what,” for example, might be facts relating to proper 
inventorship,102 or previous litigation,103 or prior sales activity.104 The alleged 
conduct might have occurred in or before the USPTO,105 in a specific district 
  
 100 See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
 101 Oracle, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (citations omitted). 
 102 See, e.g., Mycone Dental Supply Co. v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., No. 11-4380 
JBS, 2013 WL 3216145, at *3 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) (noting that the plaintiff-patentee’s 
challenge to the defendant’s inequitable allegations was based, in part, on the defendant’s 
failure to “identify the [defendant’s] employees that should have been named as 
inventors”). 
 103 Civix-DDI, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 711 F. Supp. 2d 839, 845–46 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(applying Exergen and refusing to dismiss an inequitable conduct charge, concluding that 
“[d]efendants have alleged that the prosecuting attorneys, including Curtis Vock, along 
with Civix inventors—W. Lincoln Bouve, William T. Semple, and Steven Oxman—
failed to disclose material information, namely, the existence of the Nav-Tech litigation, 
the interference application, the Nav-Tech settlement, and the conception documents, to 
the [USPTO] while Civix was prosecuting the ‘622, ‘307, and ‘291 patents during the 
time period of 1999 and 2000”). 
 104 See, e.g., Mycone, 2013 WL 3216145, at *7 (holding that a pleading that “does not 
specify the commercial sales information that [the patentee] should have disclosed” does 
not satisfy the Exergen standard). 
 105 See, e.g., Senju Pharm. Co., v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306–07 (D. Del. 
2013) (“The pleadings at issue sufficiently plead the . . . ‘where’ (materials omitted in 
submissions to the [USPTO] and teachings of the written description) standard[].”). 
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court,106 or out in the marketplace.107 Whatever the relevant allegedly 
undisclosed or misrepresented information, and wherever it is found or occurred, 
a challenger seeking to plead inequitable conduct after Exergen is well-advised 
to be as specific as possible in setting forth facts corresponding to the “what” 
and “where” of the asserted improper conduct. 
c. Pleading the “When” and “How”/”Why” 
“When” the alleged inequitable conduct occurred depends on the nature 
of the alleged misconduct. For example, where the conduct at issue involves 
undisclosed information, some courts have found it sufficient for the challenger 
to allege that the misconduct occurred “during prosecution.”108 Others have 
not.109 However, allegations that the nondisclosure occurred during the pendency 
of the prosecution, with specific references to the filing dates of disclosure 
statements that did not include the allegedly withheld information, have been 
held sufficient. For example, according to the court in BASF Catalysts LLC v. 
Aristo Inc.:110 
[T]he “when” component was identified by Aristo as occurring during the 
pending ‘210 patent application, from June 21, 1996 through February 2, 
1999, and particularly in the disclosure statements filed by BASF on 
August 1, 1996, and February 3, 1998. Alleging the exact dates and 
  
 106 See, e.g., Civix-DDI, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (stating that regarding an alleged 
failure to disclose relevant litigation, the “where” requirement was met with allegations 
that the conduct at issue occurred in the “District Court in Colorado and at the 
[USPTO]”). 
 107 See DeRenzi & Jackson, supra note 85, at 11 (“When the alleged inequitable 
conduct is based on a failure to disclose relevant activities, such as sales, offers for sale, 
or litigation, specific identification of the location of the activity is necessary.”). 
 108 Id. (collecting cases holding “during prosecution”-style allegations sufficient). 
 109 See, e.g., Target Training Int’l, Ltd., v. Extended Disc N. Am., Inc., No. H-10-
3350, 2011 WL 3235683, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2011) (“The defendant admits to not 
pinpointing specific people responsible for its vague allegation of inequitable conduct, 
and only offers a six-year patent prosecution period as the time frame for the alleged 
wrongdoing.”); Halo Elecs. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., No. C–07–06222 RMW, 2010 WL 
2464811, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) (holding the defendant’s inequitable conduct 
allegations, including assertions that the conduct at issue occurred during prosecution, 
insufficient for “fail[ing] to specify the who, what, when, where, and how of the material 
misrepresentations or omissions, as required by [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 9(b).”). 
 110 No. 2:07-cv-222-PPS-APR, 2010 WL 2952982 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2010). 
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documents containing the inequitable conduct satisfies the “when” portion 
of the Exergen standard.111 
Other types of inequitable conduct defenses (or counterclaims) may 
necessitate allegations regarding when particular events occurred (for example, 
pre-critical date sales or uses),112 or when specified persons became aware of 
particular information.113 
The “how” aspect of the Exergen standard has been called “[t]he most 
difficult step in the Exergen analysis[, requiring] the causal link between the 
activity alleged and the granting of the patents in suit.”114 The Federal Circuit 
held that the pleading at issue in Exergen failed the “how” inquiry because 
although it “state[d] generally that the withheld references are ‘material’ and 
‘not cumulative to the information already of record,’” it did “not identify the 
particular claim limitations, or combination of claim limitations, that are 
supposedly absent from the information of record.”115 According to the court, 
“[s]uch allegations are necessary to explain both ‘why’ the withheld information 
is material and not cumulative, and ‘how’ an examiner would have used this 
information in assessing the patentability of the claims.”116 
The Federal Circuit’s language in this regard has spawned some 
disagreement among the district courts as to whether there is a “why” 
  
 111 Id. at *4; see also McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc. v. Lacks Indus., Inc., 
No. 09-cv-11594, 2010 WL 4643081, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2010) (approving as 
satisfying the Exergen “when” requirements allegations relating to conduct during the 
pendency of the patents at issue, which allegations stated “[t]hat information should have 
been given in information disclosure statements the inventors and [the attorney] filed 
with the USPTO on November 7, 2003, and July 8, 2004”). 
 112 See, e.g., Somanetics Corp. v. CAS Med. Sys., Inc., No. 09-13110, 2010 WL 
2178836, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2010) (applying the Exergen standard to a pleading 
alleging an intentional withholding of an “on sale” event, holding that the “when” was 
satisfied by “identif[ying] the execution date of the [sales] Agreement [at issue], and the 
issue date of two relevant press releases related to the Agreement”). 
 113 See, e.g., Aerocrine AB v. Apieron Inc., No. 08-787-LPS, 2010 WL 1225090, at *9 
(D. Del. Mar. 30, 2010) (“The ‘when’—describing when the inventors became aware of 
the allegedly material prior art—is either during the 1993 Cologne Conference, or, at the 
latest, by the 1998 Toronto Workshop; in either case the art was not disclosed to the 
[USPTO] during prosecution of the ‘610 patent.”). 
 114 McKechnie, 2010 WL 4643081, at *5. 
 115 Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 116 Id. at 1329–30. 
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requirement distinct from the “how.”117 The district court in Johnson Outdoors 
Inc. v. Navico, Inc.118 described the debate (and its and another court’s 
resolution) as follows: 
For a “withholding” claim, the party alleging inequitable conduct must 
explain “‘why’ the withheld information is material and not cumulative, 
and ‘how’ an examiner would have used this information in assessing the 
patentability of the claims.” In Lincoln National Life v. Jackson National 
Life Insurance Company, the district court noted that “a plain reading of 
the Exergen opinion strongly suggests there is no independent ‘why’ 
requirement . . . . Rather, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ factors . . . both refer to the 
broader requirement of materiality.” The Northern District of Indiana 
arrived at this conclusion for several reasons. First, the court noted that the 
Federal Circuit in Exergen explicitly adopted the who, what, where, when, 
and how requirements from the Seventh Circuit opinion in DiLeo [v. Ernst 
& Young], 901 F.2d [624,] 627 [7th Cir. 1990].DiLeo made no mention of 
an independent “why” requirement, or a “why” requirement at all. Second, 
as observed in Lincoln National Life, the Exergen court itself did not 
mention a “why” requirement when it first adopted the Seventh Circuit’s 
standard. Rather, Exergen held “that in pleading inequitable conduct in 
patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, 
when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission 
committed before the [USPTO].” Nor did it later when the Exergen court 
elaborated the standard for a second time. The “why” was elevated to the 
status of a pleading requirement based on the parentless “scare quotes” 
escorting the word later in the Exergen opinion. 
 
This court agrees with the reasons elaborated by the Northern District of 
Indiana, and adds one of its own. The so-called “why” requirement, as the 
Exergen court has spelled it out, requires the court to examine both the 
withheld information in order to determine its actual materiality, and the 
information actually presented to the [USPTO] to determine whether the 
withheld information is cumulative. This is not an appropriate examination 
to conduct at the pleading stage.119 
In holding that there is no separate “why” requirement, the Lincoln National 
court concluded that “the ‘how’ and ‘why’ factors described by the Federal 
Circuit both refer to the broader requirement of materiality.”120 More 
  
 117 “Litigants defending against a motion to amend, including Lincoln in the present 
case, have seized on this apparent addition and attempted to write a distinct ‘why’ 
requirement into the Federal Circuit’s holding.” Lincoln Nat. Life v. Jackson Nat. Life 
Ins. Co., No. 1:07–CV–265, 2010 WL 1781013, at *6 (N.D. Ind. May 3, 2010) (citing 
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec Inc., No. 1:08-cv-918, 2010 WL 1427592, at *7–8 
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 8, 2010)). 
 118 774 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 
 119 Id. at 1198 (citations omitted). 
 120 Lincoln Nat., 2010 WL 1781013, at *7. 
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specifically, “the party seeking leave to amend must show how the patent 
examiner would have used the withheld reference in evaluating the patent 
application; that is to say, why the withheld information is material and not 
cumulative to the information already disclosed.”121 
Another debate concerning the “how” factor relates to whether an 
inequitable conduct challenger must expressly (and separately) allege that the 
(undisclosed or allegedly misrepresented) information at issue was not 
cumulative.122 As noted above, the Federal Circuit held that the pleading at issue 
in Exergen failed the “how” inquiry because although it “state[d] generally that 
the withheld references are ‘material’ and ‘not cumulative to the information 
already of record,’” it did “not identify the particular claim limitations, or 
combination of claim limitations, that are supposedly absent from the 
information of record.”123 The court continued: “[s]uch allegations are necessary 
to explain both ‘why’ the withheld information is material and not cumulative, 
and ‘how’ an examiner would have used this information in assessing the 
patentability of the claims.”124 It is this language in Exergen that has given rise 
to the debate regarding whether a pleader must expressly allege that the 
allegedly withheld or misrepresented information at issue was not cumulative of 
the other information before the USPTO examiner.125 
As the district court in Aerocrine AB v. Apieron Inc.126 recognized, 
however, the problem in Exergen was not a failure to expressly alleged non-
cumulativeness, but rather the bald (unexplained) allegation to that effect.127 
Thus, the Aerocrine court found allegations identifying particular claim 
limitations that were asserted to be missing from the information of record 
before the USPTO, and “explaining that a reasonable examiner would have 
found this art to be material to at least [specified claims], because it represents 
the prior invention, anticipates, and/or renders obvious at least those claims” 
sufficient to “explain the ‘why’ and ‘how.’”128 The court noted, however, the 
existence of “disagreement in the reported case law on this point.”129 
That disagreement among the district courts as to whether Exergen treats 
non-cumulativeness as an aspect of the defense that must be pled in addition to 
(sufficient allegations of) materiality continues. Some courts, for example, have 
  
 121 Id. 
 122 See, e.g., Aerocrine AB v. Apieron Inc., No. 08-787-LPS, 2010 WL 1225090, at *9 
(D. Del. Mar. 30, 2010). 
 123 Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 124 Id. at 1329–30. 
 125 See Aerocrine AB, 2010 WL 1225090, at *9. 
 126 No. 08-787-LPS, 2010 WL 1225090 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2010). 
 127 Id. at *9. 
 128 Id. This case was decided before the Federal Circuit altered the materiality standard 
in Therasense. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 129 See Aerocrine AB, 2010 WL 1225090, at *9 n.7 (collecting cases). 
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held that specific allegations that particular (undisclosed or misrepresented) 
information anticipates or renders obvious specific claims necessarily alleges 
that the information is not cumulative. For example, in Cumberland Pharm., 
Inc., v. Mylan Institutional LLC,130 the court held: 
By asserting that the withheld information would anticipate and/or render 
obvious each and every claim of the ‘356 patent, Mylan is clearly alleging 
that the patent application would not have been granted had the 
information been disclosed. Based on these allegations, the court can 
reasonably infer that the undisclosed information was not cumulative of 
the information before the [USPTO].131 
The contrasting approach—interpreting the Exergen “how” factor as requiring 
an inequitable conduct pleading to specifically allege that (or even explain why) 
the information at issue is not cumulative in addition to specifically alleging and 
explaining how the information is material—is illustrated by the following 
excerpt from the recent decision of the district court in Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech. 
Co., LTD.:132 
To fully plead that a specific person omitted material information, the 
Defendants’ pleading must also explain both “why” the withheld 
information is material and not cumulative, and ‘how’ an examiner would 
have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims.” 
 
Information that is withheld from the USPTO is but-for material only 
when “the [USPTO] would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of 
the undisclosed prior art.” Defendants’ counterclaim alleges that “[h]ad the 
USPTO been aware of a sale or any public disclosure made prior to June 
14, 2010 of the Moshi iVisor AG or the Moshi iVisor Pro, the ‘942 Patent 
would not have issued.” Given the similarity between the laptop computer 
  
 130 No. 12 C 3846, 2012 WL 6567922 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012). 
 131 Id. at *6 (citing Pollin Patent Licensing, LLC v. Capital One Auto Fin., Inc., No. 10 
CV 07420, 2011 WL 5118891, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2011)). A similar analysis was 
undertaken by the court in Bone Care Int’l v. Pentech Pharm., No. 08 CV 1083, 2010 
WL 1655455 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2010): 
In allegation D, Defendants allege that examiners relied on five of the omitted 
references in prior related patent applications to make rejections of 
substantially similar claims to those presented in the ‘488 application. 
Defendants also specify the claims of the ‘488 application to which each 
omitted reference is relevant. With respect to the five references, the clear 
implication is that if the references had been before the examiner on the ‘488 
application, the substantially similar claims would have been rejected. That 
those claims were not rejected implies that no other information before the 
examiner compelled rejection, and thus that the five omitted references are not 
cumulative. 
Id. at *6 (footnote omitted). 
 132 No. 2:12–cv–00053–GMN, 2013 WL 876036 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013). 
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screen protectors and the products embodying the ‘942 Patent, the Court 
finds that Defendants have adequately pleaded that the patent examiner 
might not have allowed the unspecified claims if he/she had been aware of 
these undisclosed products. 
 
The same cannot be said for Defendants’ allegations that the two products 
were not cumulative of the information already disclosed during 
prosecution. “It is well-established . . . that information is not material if it 
is cumulative of other information already disclosed to the [USPTO].” 
Accordingly, to satisfy the “why” component, Defendants’ counterclaim 
must also plead with particularity that the withheld information is not 
cumulative of the information actually disclosed during prosecution. Such 
facts are absent from Defendants’ counterclaim. Therefore, the Court finds 
that Defendants’ counterclaim fails to plead with particularity “why” the 
withheld information is material and not cumulative.133 
Clearly, until the Federal Circuit resolves these differing interpretations of 
the “how” requirement, a pleader would be well-advised to plead facts 
specifically (and perhaps separately) addressing “why” the information at issue 
was material, “why” it was non-cumulative, and “‘how’ an examiner would 
have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims.”134 
d. Pleading Deceptive Intent 
As discussed above, in Exergen, the Federal Circuit held that 
“knowledge” and “intent” may be stated generally, but a pleading of inequitable 
conduct “must include sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a 
court may reasonably infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld 
material information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) 
withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the 
[USPTO].”135 The district court in the Lincoln National case136 applied this 
sufficient-facts-to-support-a-reasonable-inference-of-knowledge-and-specific-
intent-to-deceive standard to an allegation of inequitable conduct based on an 
allegedly intentionally withheld reference.137 
[The defendant] has alleged that the named inventors knew of their duty to 
disclose relevant information and knew of the features of the withheld 
  
 133 Id. at *7–8 (citations omitted). The Aevoe Corp. court also cited several other cases 
it regarded as supporting the notion of a separate requirement for allegations of non-
cumulativeness. See id. at *8. 
 134 See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 135 Id. at 1328–29. 
 136 No. 1:07–CV–265, 2010 WL 1781013 (N.D. Ind. May 23, 2010), discussed supra 
notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
 137 See id. at *1. 
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Lincoln Reference that [the defendant] believes are relevant to the 
patentability of the ‘201 and ‘608 Patents. [The defendant] then argues that 
the Lincoln Reference was never cited as prior art during the prosecution 
of the ‘201 and ‘608 Patents and that it was withheld with intent to deceive 
the [USPTO]. Specifically, [the defendant] alleges that Lincoln submitted 
ten documents as part of a June 13, 2007, disclosure to the [USPTO] that 
the inventors believed were not relevant prior art. [The defendant] claims 
that Lincoln’s failure to disclose the arguably relevant Lincoln Reference 
when it did disclose documents that it believed were not relevant prior art, 
creates a reasonable inference that the inventors acted to deceive the 
[USPTO]. 
 
These allegations are sufficient to create a reasonable inference that the 
Lincoln Reference was deliberately withheld from the [USPTO].138 
The court made clear that the defendant’s ability to prove deceptive intent is a 
separate question from the adequacy of the pleading.139 
Lincoln National is an example of a pre-Therasense application of the 
Exergen intent pleading standard. Whether Therasense heightened the 
requirements for pleading deceptive intent beyond what Exergen required is 
another issue that has divided the district courts. Of course the pleading of a 
claim or defense must reflect changes in the relevant substantive definitions. 
Accordingly, a challenger “must plead a plausible claim for relief in accordance 
with Therasense.”140 But there is some disagreement among the district courts on 
  
 138 Id. at *8–9 (citations omitted). 
 139 See id. at *9 (quoting Lincoln Nat. Life v. Transamerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., No. 
1:08-cv-135, 2009 WL 4547131, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 25, 2009)) (stating “‘[t]he 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) do not require that [the defendant] 
definitively prove the merits of its claim. What is determinative here is that [Lincoln] was 
given fair notice of the basis for [the defendant’s] inequitable conduct defense.’”). The 
court also cited with approval Nycomed U.S. Inc. v. Glenmark Generics Ltd., No. 08-cv-
5023(CBA)(RLM), 2010 WL 1257803, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (quoting Pall 
Corp. v. Cuno Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)) (“In sum, ‘[t]he issue 
before the Court is not whether [the defendant] will ultimately prevail, but whether it is 
entitled to offer evidence’ to support its allegations of inequitable conduct.”). 
 140 See, e.g., Mycone Dental Supply Co., v. Creative Nail Design, Inc., No. 11-4380 
JBS, 2013 WL 3216145, at *6 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) (citing Bayer Cropscience AG v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC, No. 10-1045 RMB-JS, 2012 WL 1253047, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 
12, 2012)) (“Although the Therasense decision did not squarely address the pleading 
requirements for an inequitable conduct defense, but instead involved the review of a 
district court’s opinion after a bench trial, the decision is still relevant to the pleading 
issues involved herein.”). 
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the specific issue of how the Federal Circuit’s substantive “single most 
reasonable inference” standard affects the pleading of deceptive intent.141 
For example, the patentee in Wyeth Holdings Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc.142 
initially argued that “unless the Court finds that intent to deceive is the ‘single 
most reasonable inference’ that can be drawn from the facts alleged in [the 
challenger’s] pleading, Therasense compels dismissal of [the] inequitable 
conduct defense.”143 In his Report and Recommendation Regarding Plaintiffs’ 
Motion to Dismiss Sandoz’s Fourth Counterclaim and to Strike Sandoz’s Fourth 
Affirmative Defense Directed to Inequitable Conduct, U. S. Magistrate Judge 
Christopher Burke rejected this argument, after discussing “how the ‘single most 
reasonable inference’ language from Therasense should be reconciled with the 
‘reasonable inference’ directives from Exergen”:144 
Several district courts have recently confronted this question and have 
reached different conclusions. On one end of the spectrum, the District of 
South Dakota [in Hansen Mfg. Corp v. Enduro Sys., Inc., No. CIV. 
114030, 2011 WL 5526627, at *4 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2011)] denied a 
motion for leave to file an amended answer alleging inequitable conduct 
because “there [were] multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn” 
from the facts alleged in the proposed inequitable conduct pleading. This 
conclusion derives from the Hansen Court’s determination that 
“Therasense tightened the standard for pleading so that specific intent to 
deceive must be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn 
from the evidence.” [S]ee also Quest Software, Inc. v. Centrify Corp., No. 
2:10—CV—859 TS, 2011 WL 5508820, at *2-3 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2011) 
(denying defendant’s motion for leave to file amended answer including 
inequitable conduct claim in part because “the allegations do not reveal 
that the intent to deceive is the most reasonable inference to be drawn from 
the evidence”). 
 
Other courts have held that the “single most reasonable inference” 
standard applies to at least some extent in the pleading context. For 
instance, the Eastern District of Virginia [in Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc., 803 F.Supp.2d 409 (E.D. Va. 2011)] determined that “Exergen 
still states the correct elements required for pleading inequitable conduct 
  
 141 See, e.g., Cutsforth, Inc. v. Lemm Liquidating Co., No. 12-cv-1200 (SRN/JSM), 
2013 WL 2455979, at *4 n.9 (D. Minn. June 6, 2013) (observing that “[d]istrict courts are 
currently conflicted on the effect of the Federal Circuit’s holding in Therasense on the 
pleading requirements for the specific intent to deceive element” and citing decisions 
reaching different conclusions as to the significance of the “single most reasonable 
inference” requirement at the pleading stage). 
 142 No. 09–955–LPS, 2012 WL 600715 (D. Del. Feb. 3, 2012). 
 143 Id. at *6. The Magistrate Judge noted that Wyeth subsequently withdrew its 
contention that the Therasense standard should guide the determination of the sufficiency 
of the pleading. See id. 
 144 Id. 
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after Therasense,” and that a party is not required at the pleading stage “to 
meet the clear and convincing evidence standard that applies on the 
merits.” However, the Pfizer Court concluded that in light of Therasense, 
“a party must make an initial showing from which it may be plausibly 
inferred that . . . the intent to deceive is the single most likely explanation 
for the non-disclosure [of but-for material information].” [A]ccord VDF 
FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Sandwich Isles Trading Co., Civ. No. 1100288 
ACK_RLP, 2011 WL 6820122, at *6 (D. Haw. Dec. 27, 2011) (dismissing 
an inequitable conduct counterclaim where the allegations pled did not 
“give rise to a plausible inference that the intent to deceive was the single 
most likely explanation” for the alleged conduct). While the Pfizer and 
VDF Courts did not take as rigid a view as did Hansen, they nonetheless 
held that the “single most reasonable” rubric has been engrafted onto the 
inequitable conduct pleading standard from Exergen.145 
Magistrate Judge Burke cited three reasons for disagreeing with the Pfizer and 
Hansen courts, and holding that “to adequately plead the intent prong of an 
inequitable conduct defense, the claimant need only allege facts from which the 
Court could reasonably infer that the patent applicant made a deliberate decision 
to deceive the [USPTO].”146 His analysis is thoughtful and thorough: 
First, the Federal Circuit explains in Therasense that the “single most 
reasonable inference” requirement is an evidentiary standard that must be 
satisfied at the proof stage, not a pleading standard. The Federal Circuit 
notes that “to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, the specific 
intent to deceive must be the single most reasonable inference able to be 
drawn from the evidence . . . Indeed, the evidence must be sufficient to 
require a finding of deceitful intent in light of all the circumstances.” This 
statement is couched strictly in terms of the ultimate evidentiary analysis, 
in which a district court determines whether under a heightened standard 
of proof (the clear and convincing evidence standard), deceptive intent is 
the single most reasonable inference to be drawn. This form of analysis 
clearly contrasts with the pleading stage analysis required by [Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)] which asks whether, taking all of the alleged 
facts as true, the Court can draw the “reasonable inference” that a party is 
liable for the claimed misconduct, such that the claim is “plausible.” After 
all, courts “do not inquire whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail when 
considering a motion to dismiss, only whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
offer evidence to support his or her claims.” Moreover, at the pleading 
stage, a court does not (and cannot) review “all of the circumstances” at 
play in a case, as the Therasense “single most reasonable inference” 
inquiry requires. Instead, a court assessing the sufficiency of a pleading 
looks only to a narrow category of materials (the pleading and any 
attached exhibits) provided only by one side (the party or parties asserting 
the inequitable conduct claim). 
 
  
 145 Id. at *7 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 146 Id. 
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Second, in Exergen, the Federal Circuit appeared to specifically indicate 
that the “single most reasonable inference” analysis was a separate inquiry 
from that used to examine whether inequitable conduct is well-pled. After 
holding that a party must plead facts from which a court can “reasonably 
infer” that material information was misrepresented or withheld with the 
specific intent to deceive the [USPTO], the Exergen Court noted how this 
pleading standard differs from the applicable standard of proof first 
articulated in Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 
1357, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008): 
In contrast to the pleading stage, to prevail on the merits, the accused 
infringer must prove both materiality and intent by clear and 
convincing evidence. See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. Whereas 
an inference of deceptive intent must be reasonable and drawn from 
a pleading’s allegations of underlying fact to satisfy Rule 9(b), this 
inference must be the ‘single most reasonable inference able to be 
drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard.’ 
Id. at 1366.  
Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329 n. 5. To read Therasense as disturbing this well-
established dichotomy would be to collapse inequitable conduct into a mini-
trial on the pleadings, and to ignore the clear holdings from both Star 
Scientific and Exergen. The Court finds no language in Therasense to 
support such an outcome . . . . 
Third, this reading is corroborated by the Federal Circuit’s own post-
Therasense case law. In Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 
655 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the Federal Circuit stated that “[a] charge 
of inequitable conduct based on a failure to disclose will survive a motion 
to dismiss only if the plaintiff’s complaint recites facts from which the 
court may reasonably infer that a specific individual both knew of 
invalidating information that was withheld from the [USPTO] and 
withheld that information with a specific intent to deceive the [USPTO].” 
Although this statement does not definitively resolve the issue . . . , it 
strongly suggests that [a pleader] need only set forth facts from which 
deceptive intent can be reasonably inferred. Accord Human Genome 
Sciences, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Case No. 2:11–cv–6519–MRP (JEMx), 
slip op. at 6 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (considering Therasense and Exergen 
and concluding that “[i]n order to survive dismissal [of an inequitable 
conduct claim], the accused infringer must allege facts from which it is 
plausible that the applicant had an intent to deceive,” and need not 
demonstrate that deceptive intent is “the most reasonable inference”).147 
  
 147 Id. at *7–8. Accord W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 
630, 634 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2012), and Cutsforth, Inc. v. Lemm Liquidating Co., No. 12-cv-
1200 (SRN/JSM), 2013 WL 2455979, at *4 n.9 (D. Minn. June 6, 2013) (each citing the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Delano Farms). 
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The issue of whether Therasense augmented the pleading requirements 
announced in Exergen awaits definitive resolution by the Federal Circuit.148 
Clearly, however, a requirement that patent challengers allege facts supporting 
deceptive intent as the most reasonable inference (as opposed to a plausible 
inference) would be difficult to satisfy in many cases at the pleading stage. 
The recent decision of the district court in Parkervision, Inc. v. 
Qualcomm Inc.149 dismissing an inequitable conduct allegation based on alleged 
“burying” of the assigned USPTO examiner “‘with hundreds of references so as 
to distract his attention from highly relevant references’” illustrates how the 
combination of Exergen and Therasense may impact pleading standards.150 
Noting that Exergen requires “‘sufficient allegations of underlying facts from 
which a court may reasonably infer’” that the patentee “‘withheld or 
misrepresented [the] information with a specific intent to deceive the 
[USPTO],’” the district court held that “an equally if not more reasonable 
inference [to be drawn from the allegation that the patentee inundated the 
examiner] is that [the patentee] aimed to insulate itself from such claims by 
over-disclosing references.”151 Parkervision thus suggests that where a court can 
reasonably infer that deceptive intent is not the single most reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the alleged facts, dismissal of the subject allegations may be 
appropriate. 
C. Lessons from Therasense and Exergen 
To summarize, Therasense, Exergen, and the decisions applying them 
thus far suggest the following lessons for litigants and counsel: 
 
 Withheld information that is found to anticipate or render obvious 
claims under a “clear and convincing evidence” standard 
necessarily satisfies the Therasense “but-for materiality” standard. 
 Even where the USPTO requires disclosure of information, that 
information may not be regarded as material under Therasense. 
 As compared with the pre-Therasense period, the development of 
Federal Circuit law relating materiality may be delayed to the 
extent the court declines to rule on materiality in cases where the 
deceptive intent standard is clearly not satisfied. 
  
 148 The appellate briefs in Delano Farms were filed in early 2011 before Therasense 
was decided, and, accordingly, did not raise the issue of whether Therasense raised the 
bar for pleading deceptive intent beyond what Exergen requires. 
 149 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2013). 
 150 See id. at 1318. 
 151 Id. (“Because specific intent to deceive is not the only or single most reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the disclosure of voluminous references to the [USPTO], 
Qualcomm’s pleading of the ‘burying’ theory fails as a matter of law.”). 
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 The Federal Circuit will closely scrutinize district court rulings and 
records regarding evidence of deceptive intent, which can be 
expected to influence district courts, in turn, to carefully consider 
such evidence. In particular, challengers will need to marshal 
evidence of a deliberate decision to deceive, or at least show that 
deceptive intent is the most reasonable inference to be drawn from 
the evidence. 
 Deceptive intent findings that are based significantly on the 
materiality of the withheld or misrepresented information will be 
vulnerable on appeal. 
 Allegations that inequitable conduct was committed by entities, 
“persons involved in the prosecution,” or “inventors and/or 
attorneys” are unlikely to be held sufficient. To satisfy Exergen’s 
“who” requirement, inequitable conduct pleadings must expressly 
(or effectively) “name names.” 
 There is some disagreement among the district courts regarding 
inequitable conduct pleading requirements, including whether 
there is a “why” requirement distinct from the “how” requirement, 
whether an inequitable conduct challenger must expressly allege 
that the undisclosed or allegedly misrepresented information was 
not cumulative to other information before the examiner, and the 
impact the Federal Circuit’s substantive “single most reasonable 
inference” standard on the pleading of deceptive intent. 
 The precise interplay between Therasense and Exergen on 
pleading allegations relating to deceptive intent is unresolved. 
II. THE LEGISLATURE’S CONTRIBUTION: SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION 
The AIA created a new USPTO proceeding designated as a 
“supplemental examination.”152 The purpose is “to consider, reconsider, or 
correct information believed to be relevant to the patent” that is the subject of 
the request.153 The USPTO is charged with evaluating the information presented 
in the request under the familiar reexamination standard: “whether [it] raises a 
  
 152 See 35 U.S.C. § 257 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 
113-54 and 113-56) approved 12-9-13). 
 153 See id. § 257(a). 
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substantial new question of patentability,”154 and it will have three months to 
make that determination.155 Only the patent owner can request a supplemental 
examination.156 
According to the new law, the consequence of a USPTO determination 
that any of the information in the request for supplemental examination raises a 
substantial new question of patentability is a reexamination proceeding157 that 
differs from the usual ex parte reexamination in two principal respects. First, the 
patent owner (who filed the request for supplemental examination in the first 
place) is barred from submitting a statement.158 Second, and significantly, the 
restriction limiting reexamination to consideration of “patents and printed 
publications”159 does not apply,160 and “information” is not otherwise limited or 
defined in the legislation.161 Accordingly, a patent owner can use supplemental 
examination not only to bring to the attention of the USPTO prior art patents and 
printed publications, but also non-print prior art (such as pre-critical date sales 
and public uses) and non-prior art information of the kind the Federal Circuit 
had held to be material for purposes of the inequitable conduct defense, prior to 
Therasense. Such non-prior art information includes: 
 
  
 154 See id. “If . . . the Director finds that a substantial new question of patentability 
affecting any claim of a patent is raised, the determination will include an order for 
reexamination of the patent for resolution of the question.” Id. § 304; see, e.g., In re 
Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that “[t]he ‘substantial new 
question of patentability’ requirement prevents potential harassment of patentees by 
‘act[ing] to bar reconsideration of any argument already decided by the [USPTO], 
whether during the original examination or an earlier reexamination.’” (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 96-1307(I) (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462, 6466)). 
 155 See 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding 
P.L. 113-54 and 113-56) approved 12-9-13). 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See id. § 257(b). 
 159 35 U.S.C. § 302 authorizes “[a]ny person [to] file a request for reexamination . . . 
of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 
301,” which authorizes the citation of “prior art consisting of patents or printed 
publications.” See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54 
and 113-56) approved 12-9-13). 
 160 Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act and To Review Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828 
(Aug. 14, 2012) (“Unlike a request for ex parte reexamination, the items of information 
presented in a request for supplemental examination are not limited to patents and printed 
publications.”). 
 161 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 12 
(2011). 
 
80 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property [Vol. 13 
 
 
 
 unpublished notes taken by a non-inventor, co-employee at a 
poster presentation,162 
 a non-prior art article relevant to whether the claims at issue were 
enabled,163 
 a third-party’s patent application (in the inventor’s possession) and 
information regarding the third-party’s model of his own invention 
(which the inventor had seen),164 
 “intentional falsehoods, misrepresentations, and nondisclosures” 
relating to inventorship,165 
 a false statement in a Petition to Make Special,166 and 
 unjustified claims to small entity status.167 
 
Some of the non-prior art information listed above (without more) clearly will 
not raise a “substantial new question of patentability,”168 and even more clearly 
  
 162 Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Biosciences N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 163 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 164 GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 165 PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1320 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 166 Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 167 See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ulead 
Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 168 “The presence or absence of a ‘substantial new question of patentability’ 
determines whether or not reexamination is ordered.” Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (MPEP) § 2242 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). According to the USPTO’s rules 
for implementing supplemental examination, “[t]he decision as to whether the 
information submitted in a request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new 
question of patentability is identical to the decision as to whether the information 
submitted in a request for ex parte reexamination raises a substantial new question of 
patentability, except that the information submitted in a request for supplemental 
examination is not limited to patents and publications and may be directed to issues of 
patentability in addition to those permitted in ex parte reexamination, such as issues 
under 35 U.S.C. 101 and 112.” Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and to Review Reexamination Fees, 
77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 48,831 (Aug. 14, 2012). In ex parte reexamination, “[a] prior art 
patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability where there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the prior art patent or 
printed publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable.” Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2242. Accordingly, in supplemental 
examination, information will raise a substantial new question of patentability where 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the 
information important in deciding whether or not a claim is patentable. 
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will not satisfy the Federal Circuit’s new “but-for” materiality standard.169 
However, at least where there is doubt about how a court might regard 
information—prior art or otherwise—that was (or was arguably) not considered 
(or inadequately considered) by the USPTO during original (or a prior) 
prosecution, a patent owner could elect to pursue supplemental examination. 
New § 257(c) of the Patent Act sets forth the preemptive protection a patent 
owner can obtain via supplemental examination: 
A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to 
information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or 
was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was 
considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental examination 
of the patent. The making of a request under subsection (a), or the absence 
thereof, shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 
282.170 
This is the key provision in the supplemental examination portion of the 
AIA. Unless certain exceptions relating to timing apply,171 the legislation strips 
the courts of the power to hold patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct in 
cases where the patentee has previously secured, via supplemental examination, 
USPTO consideration of the information the patent challenger alleges was 
withheld or misrepresented.172 
  
 169 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 170 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) (current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54 and 
113-56) approved 12-9-13). 
 171 The injunction against a determination of unenforceability will not operate if either 
of two statutory exceptions applies. These exceptions relate to timing, and will be 
triggered by specified events. First, a patent owner contemplating an enforcement action 
(either in the district courts or in the International Trade Commission) and seeking to 
head off an anticipated inequitable conduct charge based on particular information will 
only obtain the benefit of the § 257(c)(1) protection if the USPTO has concluded its 
supplemental examination of that information (at the patent owner’s request) and any 
resulting reexamination before the patent owner files its enforcement action. See id. 
§ 257(c)(2)(B). The second exception applies when the patent challenger (as opposed to 
the patent owner) makes the first move, e.g., by filing a declaratory judgment action or 
answer to complaint containing particularized allegations of inequitable conduct, or by 
sending the patent owner a Paragraph IV letter, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I–IV) 
(2006), before the patent owner files a supplemental examination request. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 257(c)(2)(A). In such a case, supplemental examination will not preclude litigation of 
the inequitable conduct defense at issue. These two exceptions operate to encourage 
patent owners to seek (and complete) supplemental examination (and any resulting 
reexamination) regarding any potentially problematic information before filing suit. A 
patent challenger who wants to press an inequitable conduct defense, on the other hand, 
will have to assert that defense—in a declaratory judgment complaint, an answer to an 
infringement complaint, or a Paragraph IV letter—before the patentee initiates a 
supplemental examination. 
 172 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1). 
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The new § 257 took effect on September 16, 2012 and “appl[ies] to any 
patent issued before, on, or after that date.”173 Thus, patent owners can use 
supplemental examination to anticipatorily defeat potential inequitable conduct 
charges relating to any of their issued, pending, or future patents. 
III. OPTIONS FOR PATENT OWNERS AFTER THERASENSE AND THE AIA 
A patent owner considering enforcement, but concerned about or aware 
of a potential inequitable conduct issue, should consider the implications of 
Therasense and the AIA. Thanks to these and other recent developments, the 
menu of potential options for such a patent owner has changed. This section 
discusses the options, post-Therasense and the AIA, for patent owners faced 
with a potential inequitable conduct challenge. 
A. Therasense’s Impact on the Evidentiary Significance of Reexamination and 
Reissue 
The first thing to consider is that as a result of Therasense, the evidentiary 
significance of reexamination and reissue has been altered. Prior to Therasense, 
a rejection of claims in reexamination or reissue over a previously undisclosed 
reference or references could serve as evidence of materiality. A claim rejection 
is an assertion by the USPTO that the reference(s) at issue prima facie anticipate 
or render obvious the claim(s) at issue.174 A rejection thus represents the opinion 
of the USPTO—the expert agency—that more likely than not, the claims at 
issue are not patentable over the cited prior art. If the claims are (more likely 
than not) not patentable over a reference or references, then clearly a 
“‘reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow 
the application to issue as a patent.’”175 And before Therasense, materiality 
could be established by satisfying the “reasonable examiner” standard.176 
  
 173 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 12 
(2011). 
 174 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As the court in In re Oetiker 
explained: 
The prima facie case is a procedural tool of patent examination, allocating the 
burdens of going forward as between examiner and applicant. The term “prima 
facie case” refers only to the initial examination step . . . . [T]he examiner bears 
the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of 
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the 
burden of coming forward with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant. 
Id. 
 175 See Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977), the USPTO’s previous disclosure standard). 
 176 See id. at 1316. 
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In fact, before Therasense, even the grant of a request for reexamination 
with respect to a particular reference or references was potential evidence of 
materiality,177 because the “substantial new question of patentability” standard 
the USPTO applies to determine whether to grant a request for reexamination is 
the “reasonable examiner” standard.178 Furthermore, a USPTO determination 
that a substantial new question of patentability exists is a determination that the 
subject patent or printed publication is not cumulative.179 Thus, a determination 
that a patent or publication raises a substantial new question of patentability is a 
USPTO determination that the patent or publication is material to the claim(s) at 
issue under the pre-Therasense standard.180 Of course, a denial of a 
reexamination request in light of a particular reference was (and continues to be) 
evidence of non-materiality.181 But the high reexamination grant rate,182 coupled 
  
 177 See, e.g., Robert Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with Concurrent 
District Court Litigation or Section 337 USITC Investigations, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 24 
(2010). Mr. Sterne and his co-authors note: 
Parties may attempt to use a reexamination proceeding to buttress the 
materiality prong of the inequitable conduct analysis. To do so, the omitted 
prior art reference is used as the basis for a [substantial new question of 
patentability] in a reexamination request. If the examiner is persuaded that the 
omitted prior art reference forms a [substantial new question of patentability] 
and then orders a reexamination, this will be taken as further evidence as to the 
materiality of the reference. 
Id. 
 178 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2242 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 
2010) (“A prior art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of 
patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would 
consider the prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not 
the claim is patentable.”). 
 179 See id. § 2216 (instructing examiners that to find a substantial new question of 
patentability, “[i]t must first be demonstrated that a patent or printed publication that is 
relied upon in a proposed rejection presents a new, non-cumulative technological 
teaching that was not previously considered and discussed on the record during the 
prosecution of the application that resulted in the patent for which reexamination is 
requested, and during the prosecution of any other prior proceeding involving the patent 
for which reexamination is requested”); id. § 2242 (explaining that a substantial new 
question of patentability does not exist “where the examiner finds the additional (newly 
provided) prior art patents or printed publications are merely cumulative to similar prior 
art already fully considered by the Office in a previous examination of the claim”). 
 180 MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS § 12:21 (2012) (“If 
a substantial new question is found, and especially if claims are rejected, this supports an 
argument that the reference is material.”). 
 181 See id. (“If an examiner finds no substantial new question of patentability, there is 
an argument that the reference was cumulative.”). 
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with the pre-Therasense “reasonable examiner” materiality standard, made 
reexamination more useful as a tool for generating evidence of materiality, 
rather than establishing non-materiality. 
The extent to which the courts would accept as evidence of materiality 
either a claim rejection or a grant of reexamination varied.183 But certainly, 
where a patent owner acquiesced to a rejection by amending claims in response 
to a rejection over a previously undisclosed reference, it was difficult for the 
patentee to convincingly contend that the reference was not material to 
patentability.184 
The situation has significantly changed post-Therasense. Now, where the 
USPTO confirms or issues claims over the references or information in question 
(in reexamination or reissue), such confirmation refutes the notion that “but-for” 
the USPTO’s inability to consider the reference, the claims in question would 
not have issued. That the reexamination request was granted in the first place, 
under the equivalent of the old “reasonable examiner” standard, is not enough to 
show materiality. 
Accordingly, Therasense opens up a new frontier for a patent owner 
concerned about a potential inequitable conduct issue. If the previously 
undisclosed information is a patent or printed publication, the owner may be 
able to establish, by filing a request for reexamination and showing that its 
claims are patentable over the reference, that the reference is not “but-for” 
material. However, reexamination is not the only avenue. The Federal Circuit in 
In re Tanaka185 held that reissue is available to add a dependent claim or 
  
 182 From July 1, 1981, when ex parte reexamination became available, through 
September 30, 2012, the USPTO granted ninety-two percent (92%) of such requests. See 
Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data - September 30, 2013, UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 3 (Sept. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf. 
 183 See SMITH, supra note 180, n.1 (collecting cases). 
 184 See SMITH, supra note 180. The author notes: 
The Federal Circuit has previously held that the “results” of reexamination can 
be of “strong probative value” to the question of materiality. It is not, however, 
dispositive. A rejection by the [USPTO] during reexamination over a reference 
that was previously not disclosed does not indicate materiality per se. The 
converse is also true: failure to reject claims in reexamination or the ultimate 
allowance of those claims does not indicate a lack of materiality per se. Neither 
does an amendment of claims over an omitted reference create a rule of 
materiality.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 185 640 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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claims.186 Thus the addition of a dependent claim or claims provides an avenue 
into reissue that can then be used to “vet” a previously undisclosed reference or 
references—via an information disclosure statement187—and obtain a USPTO 
determination that the reference does not anticipate or render obvious the claims 
of the patent and is, therefore, not “but-for” material. Furthermore, because the 
USPTO’s consideration of issues in reissue is not limited to prior art issues (let 
alone printed prior art issues),188 information disclosure statements in reissue can 
be used to bring to the attention information beyond that which can properly be 
considered in reexamination. Thus, one potential option for patentees faced with 
a possible inequitable conduct problem is to obviate that problem by 
establishing, via reexamination or reissue, the immateriality of the information 
at issue. 
Furthermore, although the Federal Circuit has recently reminded us that 
inequitable conduct cannot be “cured” via reexamination or reissue,189 deceptive 
intent on the part of the patentee is no longer an impediment to the use of reissue 
to obtain USPTO consideration of previously withheld or misrepresented 
information. The AIA changed the reissue statute so that it no longer limits the 
availability of reissue to the correction of errors that occurred “without any 
deceptive intention.”190 Thus, even where information was previously withheld 
  
 186 Id. at 1251–52 (holding that allowing “the addition of dependent claims as a hedge 
against possible invalidity has been embraced as a reasonable interpretation of the reissue 
statute by [the Federal Circuit] and its predecessor for nearly fifty years without any 
obvious adverse consequences”). 
 187 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1410 (8th ed. Rev.8, Aug. 
2012) (authorizing the filing of information disclosure statements in reissue). 
 188 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.176(a) (2013) (“A reissue application will be examined in the 
same manner as a non-reissue, non-provisional application, and will be subject to all the 
requirements of the rules related to non-reissue applications. Applications for reissue will 
be acted on by the examiner in advance of other applications.”); see also Kenie Ho, 
Esther H. Lim & Charles E. Van Horn, Effective Uses of Reissues and Reexaminations in 
the United States, CHINA IP NEWS (June 2009), available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=6424bc6c-0369-
48a8-963d-014909818582 (“In reissue, patentability issues may be submitted based on 
any type of prior art, such as patents, printed publications, and prior knowledge, use, or 
sale of the claimed invention.”). 
 189 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (citing Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm. Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 
1341 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)) (“Unlike other deficiencies, inequitable conduct cannot be cured by reissue, or 
reexamination.”). 
 190 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2002) (“Whenever any patent is, through error without 
any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid . . . .”), with 35 
U.S.C. § 251(a) (current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54 and 113-56) 
approved 12-9-13) (“Whenever any patent is, through error deemed wholly or partly 
inoperative or invalid . . . .”). 
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or misrepresented with deceptive intent, a patentee can now obtain consideration 
of the information in reissue, at least where the information substantively relates 
to patentability.191 
Reissue would not be an appropriate choice where the information at 
issue does not bear on patentability. And although it appears that such 
information would not qualify as material under the Therasense “but-for” 
materiality standard,192 whether and under what circumstances 
misrepresentations regarding information unrelated to patentability could qualify 
as material under the alternative “affirmative egregious misconduct” standard is 
unclear.193 Accordingly, depending on the nature of the conduct and information 
underlying the potential inequitable conduct issue, reexamination or even reissue 
may not provide an adequate venue for USPTO consideration of previously 
  
 191 See, e.g., Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its 
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 126–27 (2012) (“With the removal of the 
‘deceptive intention’ provision, patent owners will be able to correct defects of any type 
in which reissue would otherwise have been proper.”); Naphtali Y. Matlis, Reissue vs. 
Supplemental Examination, POST GRANT PROCEEDINGS, available at 
http://www.postgrantproceedings.com/topics/Article-NYM_Reissue_v_Supplemental_ 
Exam.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013) (“By removing “without any deceptive intention” 
from § 251(a), the AIA, in conjunction with Therasense, arguably opens the door for 
patent owners to address questions of inequitable conduct via reissue. A patent owner 
may now admit to a defect in a patent, such a defect potentially including an omitted 
prior art reference.”). 
 192 But see Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that an applicant’s failure to update facts in a Petition to Make Special 
“obviously fails the but-for materiality standard”). 
 193 The Federal Circuit recently declined to decide whether a false declaration of small 
entity status qualifies as “affirmative egregious misconduct.” Outside the Box 
Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Prior to its 
en banc decision in Therasense, the Federal Circuit had on several occasions held that 
information unrelated to patentability could be material for purposes of the courts’ 
inequitable conduct analyses. In General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., the 
Federal Circuit held “as a matter of law that a false statement in a Petition to Make 
Special is material if . . . it succeeds in prompting expedited consideration of the 
application.” 19 F.3d 1405, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court reaffirmed this principle in 
Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). In two cases—Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., and Ulead Systems, Inc. v. Lex 
Computer & Management Corp.—the court held that unjustified claims to small entity 
status warranted the ultimate penalty of unenforceability if those statements were shown 
to have been made with deceptive intent. Nilssen, 504 F.3d 1223, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(affirming a district court decision holding all of the patents in suit unenforceable based 
on an improper assertion of entitlement to small entity status); Ulead, 351 F.3d 1139, 
1146 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding a finding that an unjustified declaration of small entity 
status in connection with a maintenance fee payment was material for inequitable conduct 
purposes). 
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undisclosed or misrepresented information, even after Therasense. This is 
certainly true pending further development of the law regarding materiality.194 
B. Resolving Anticipated Inequitable Conduct Issues: Considerations for the 
Patentee 
So, given this change in the evidentiary significance of reexamination and 
reissue post-Therasense, and the availability of supplemental examination, what 
considerations should guide the patentee’s choice of supplemental examination 
vs. the alternatives? 
1. What Information Needs To Be Considered? 
First, certain categories of information are not properly considered in 
reexamination or reissue, and, therefore, supplemental examination (in which 
any information can be considered195) may be the only viable route for 
consideration of such information. Furthermore, it is only by proceeding through 
supplemental examination that true immunity from litigating inequitable conduct 
can be obtained.196 
Because reexamination is limited to patents and printed publications,197 if 
the information concerns pre-critical date activities, or a previously-submitted 
misleading declaration, for example, reexamination will not offer the 
opportunity to have the information considered or corrected. Reissue, as noted 
above, is now available to add dependent claims,198 and there is no longer a 
requirement to allege that the reissue error was made “without any deceptive 
intention.”199 However, the patentee must consider whether submission via an 
information disclosure statement in reissue will fairly and adequately present or 
explain the information at issue. For example, depending on the circumstances, 
neither reissue nor reexamination may provide a suitable avenue for 
consideration and correction of a prior misleading declaration (whether or not 
related to patentability) or other potential “affirmative egregious misconduct” 
situations.200 
2. Is Litigating the Issue Under Therasense the Best Course? 
Second, even where the information at issue could be considered in 
reexamination or reissue, in some cases a patentee may elect to bypass the 
  
 194 See supra Part I.A.2(a). 
 195 See supra notes 159–167 and accompanying text. 
 196 See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
 197 35 U.S.C. §§ 301(a)(1), 302 (current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 113-54 
and 113-56) approved 12-9-13). 
 198 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
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USPTO and just litigate the issue of inequitable conduct under Therasense in the 
courts. As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has raised the bar for 
establishing materiality,201 and where the patentee is confident that a court will 
not find the information at issue to be “but-for” material (and there is no 
potential issue of “affirmative egregious misconduct”), the patentee may be 
well-advised to simply litigate inequitable conduct. 
3. Supplemental Examination as a Potential Fall-Back Strategy 
Third, some have suggested the strategy of filing reissue first, then 
abandoning the reissue application and filing a request for supplemental 
examination if the claims are rejected in reissue based on the information in 
question.202 Although such a rejection in reissue would tend to serve as evidence 
of materiality,203 if viable claims can be obtained in a reexamination resulting 
from a granted supplemental examination request, having proceeded through 
supplemental examination, the patent owner would be immune from inequitable 
conduct assertions based on the information in question.204 
4. Is It Too Late to Obtain Immunity via Supplemental Examination? 
As discussed above, the statutory immunity from an inequitable conduct 
challenge is available only to patent owners who file and complete supplemental 
examination (and any resulting reexamination) before initiating its enforcement 
action.205 And accused infringers can cut off the patentee’s opportunity to obtain 
immunity by asserting inequitable conduct in a declaratory judgment action or 
  
 201 See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 202 See, e.g., Scott A. McKeown, Is Supplemental Examination a Risk Worth Taking? 
PATENTS POST-GRANT (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2012/02/supplemental-examination-or-patent-
reissue; Kevin B. Laurence & Matthew C. Philips, Supplemental Examination and the 
Proposed Rules, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (March 2012), available at 
http://www.stoel.com/files/Supplemental%20Examination%20and%20the%20Proposed
%20Rules%20-%20March%202012%20-%20IP%20Today.pdf. 
 203 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. Robert Armitage has suggested 
the simultaneous use of supplemental examination and reissue: 
The AIA appears to allow the USPTO to take coordinated action in situations 
where the patent owner is seeking both reissue and supplemental examination. 
Indeed, it is foreseeable that the USPTO, if it finds a substantial new question 
of patentability at the termination of the supplemental examination of a patent 
for which a reissue application is pending, would treat de facto the reissue and 
reexamination required as a single proceeding it could conduct concurrently. 
Armitage, supra note 191, at 127. 
 205 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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Paragraph IV letter before the patent owner initiates supplemental 
examination.206 
However, particularly if supplemental examination is the only route 
through which consideration of the particular information at issue can be 
obtained,207 a patent owner who can use supplemental examination/ 
reexamination to generate evidence of immateriality may benefit from 
proceeding through supplemental examination even if the statutory immunity is 
no longer available. 
5. Applicable Standards and Procedures 
A patent owner considering using a USPTO proceeding to preempt or 
blunt an anticipated inequitable conduct charge should note that a mere 
“substantial new question of patentability” will trigger reexamination208 
(including via supplemental examination),209 whereas prima facie unpatentability 
is required for a rejection in reexamination.210 Also, a patent owner who files a 
reissue application effectively re-opens prosecution, potentially inviting 
consideration of additional issues unrelated to the information it is trying to 
show is immaterial.211 
Cost and the anticipated length of the various alternative proceedings 
should also be considered. Supplemental examination is expensive, even if no 
reexamination is ordered.212 On the other hand, the statute requires the USPTO 
to complete supplemental examination (and decide whether to order 
reexamination) within three months of the filing of the request.213 Accordingly, a 
patent owner who has a high level of confidence that the USPTO will not find a 
substantial new question of patentability based on the information in question 
could make effective and efficient use of supplemental examination to preempt 
an inequitable conduct charge. On the other hand, if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the USPTO will find a substantial new question of patentability 
and order reexamination, the patent owner should consider whether they would 
prefer to proceed through reexamination, reissue or instead (where available), 
file a continuation application to have the information at issue considered. 
  
 206 See id. 
 207 See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
 208 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 209 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 210 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 211 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.176(a) (2013) (“A reissue application will be examined in the 
same manner as a non-reissue, non-provisional application, and will be subject to all the 
requirements of the rules related to non-reissue applications.”). 
 212 See Fee Schedule, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 19, 
2013), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee031913.htm. 
 213 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 113-57 (excluding P.L. 
113-54 and 113-56) approved 12-9-13). 
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CONCLUSION 
Significant recent judicial and legislative developments have changed the 
way litigants and counsel need to plan for and litigate inequitable conduct 
allegations. Exergen and Therasense have heightened the standards for pleading 
and proving inequitable conduct, respectively, and Congress has expanded the 
patentee’s post-grant options for preempting or defeating inequitable conduct 
challenges. Litigants and counsel should holistically consider these 
developments and their implications for each particular potential inequitable 
conduct situation. 
